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Introduction
I have been asked to talk to you today--fnd to initiate a discussion on
the question: The Stages of Economic Growth and the Problems of Peaceful
Co-existence. I regard this assignment as a privilege and a responsibilitro
The issue of Soviet-American relations-and of peaceful co-existence between
our two countries-is evidently one of the great issues of our century; arx
for an American, asked to speak on these matters in Moscow in May 1959, this
must be a serious occasion. Bat it is, if I may say so, wholly proper that
such occasions should take placeo
First of all, this is an Institute dedicated to the scientific study of
World Economy and International Relations; and, as some of you know, at M.I.To,
I am both a professor of economic history and a working member of our Center
for Internatioml Studies. We-you and I-are interested in these matters not
merely as citi zens of our nations and of this planet; but also as scholars.
And there is every reason for us to exchange our scientific reflections in this
as in other fields.
But there is another reason as well that I am pleased to have been invited
to talk on this subject. Both our governments are now launched on policies of
cultural exchange. I, for one, approve of such exchanges, and I hope they will
2expand in many directions. There is simple human good in letting men travel
over the horizon to see and to be seen. It is good that we should see the
Bolshoi Ballet and you should see Por and Beess. It is good for our physical
scientists and technicians of all sorts to exchange new knowledge. But in the
end, when the ground is cleared a little-when we have learned to drink vodka,
and you, bourbon--we must try to talk with candor about the great issues that
divide us. It is important that we should come to know in our hearts that we
are all part of common humanity-that we are all God's children. But cultural
exchanges by themselves are no guarantee of peace0 Nations have fought that
understood each other very well. Neither we gathered here-nor our peoples-
should be deluded that an enlarged flow of tourist traffic is enough0 Therefore,
I look forward to our discussion today as a form of cultural exchange at a
serious level; and I welcome 3our initiative which has lead to this gathering.
What I plan to do this afternoon is to open a discussion with you by
discussing three themes.
First, the stages of economic grcoth. I have gradually come to the view
over the past twenty years that it is possible and useful to generalize the
pattern of modern economic history in the form of a series of stages of
economic growth, of which one stage-the take-off-may already be known to
you. In the first part of my lecture I shall try briefly to summrise this
scheme, which will soon be available to you in published form, at greater
length. It is, as you will quickly perceive, my alternative to the system of
historical analysis developed by Karl Marx-
Second, after outlining the stages of growth, I shall consider the position
in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America in terms of the stages of
3growth; I shall define their key domestic problems of policy; and I shall
consider the implications of their problems for the issue of Soviet-American
co-existence in the underdeveloped areas0
Third, I shall examine what light the stages of growth throw on the problem
of bringing the arms race to an end and on the problem of creating a system of
world order within which nations of different culture, different ideological
complexion, and different stages of growth may live on this small planet in
tolerable harmonyo
These are, of course, impossibly large subjects to exhaust in a single
lecture0 But ry objective is not to persuade you in this hour0 My objective is
to open a discussion--a discussion which I hope will be continued. I think I
can promise any one of you a similar audience in ry home town of Cambridge,
Massadhusetts; and I hope the discussion this afternoon-after my talk-will
be as long and lively as the one which we would have in Cambridge, on the
occasion of such a visit from Moscow,
T Stages of Economic Growth
Now, what are these stages of economic growth? I believe all sociotic,
past and present, may be usefully designated as falling within one of the five
following categories. I designate these categories the traditional society; the
preconditions for take-off; the take-off; the drive to maturity; and the age
of high mass consumption. Berond the age of high mass consumption lie the
problems and possibilities whichi are beginning to arise in a few societies, and
which may arise generally when diminishing relative mrginal utility sets in for
real income itself-that is, when the problems and burdens of scarcity gradually
retreat, and what Karl Marx called Communism is approachedo
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These five stages of growth are based on a dynamic theory of production
Out of this theory comes one key proposition. The key proposition is this: at
any period of time the momentum of an economy is maintained by the rapid rate
of growth in a relatively few key, leading sectors. In some periods cotton
textiles have been a key leading sector; in others railways, chemicals, electricity
and the automobile have served this function The importance of these key
sectors does not lie merely in their own high growth rate, but in the consequences
of their rapid expansion. Specifically, key sectors have two effects: their
rapid growth sets up a direct demand for new inputs: the whole Leontief-Kantorovich
chain that lies behind the new sector is activated; second, the development of
these new primary and secondary sectors induces new developments indirectly
elsewhere in the econong. What we western economists call external economy
effects are set in motion. (When, for example, Sweden, lacking coal, plunged
into the electrification of its railways, it not only saved coal but laid the
basis indirectly for a first-class electrical engLneering industry.)
Each stage of growth can be directly related to certain leading sectors;
but before considering the leading sectors associated with each stage of growth
we must look at the second characteristic of these stages--the demand side as
opposed to the side of supply and technology.
Each stage of growth is associated with certain ranges of income and types
of deman& All that economists group under the headings of income and price
elasticity of demand is relevant to the stages of growth analysis0 But we must
go beyond mere technical economic analysis0 For at each stage of growth societies
have been confronted with choices--basic choices of policy and of value-which
transcend economic analysis.
Let me give a few illustrations of these non-economic choices that have had
profound economic consequences0 How, for example, should the traditional society
react to the intrusion of a more advanced power: with cohesion, promptness
and vigor like the Japanese in the third quarter of the 19th century; making
a virtue of apathy like the oppressed Irish of the 18th century; by slowly and
reluctantly altering the traditional society like the Chinese after the Opium
Wars?
When modern nationhood is achieved, how-in what proportions-should the
national energies be disposed: in external aggression, to right old wrongs or
to exploit newly created or perceived possibilities for enlarged national power;
in completing and refining the political victory of the new national government
over old regional interests; or in modernising the econoug?
Once growth is under way with the take-off, to what extent should the
requirements of diffusing modern technology and increasing rate of growth be
moderated by the desire to increase consumption per capita and to increase
welfare? When technological maturity is reached--and the nation commands a
modernised and differentiated industrial mchine-to what ends should it be
put, and in what proportions: to increase social and human security, including
leisure; to expand consumption into the range of durable consumer goods and
services; or to increase the nation's stature and power on the world' scene?
These are not merely patterns of choice confronted in history. I am
sure that if you pause a moment you can think of parts of the contemporary
world where precisely these choices are nowconfronted: how to react to external
intrusion; how, in the preconditions, to channel the underlying national
sentiment; how, in the take-off, to weigh the rate of growth against human
welfare; how at technological maturity-to weigh domestic welfare against the
expansion of national power on the world scene.
The stages of growth are, then, not a set of rigid, inevitable predetermined
phases of history. The process of growth does pose fr men and societies certain
6concrete problems and possibilities from which they must choose, and these
problems and possibilities may be observed at similar stages in each society,
Modern history can be viewed as the consequence of differing choices made by
various societies, at various stages of their growth. But if we really believed
history was inevitable I would not be standing before you this afternoon and you
would not be listening to me.
Now, very briefly indeed, a few words about each stage of growth.
I define the traditional society as one which has not learned to make
invention and technological innovation a regular flow* The traditional society
is not static; but its growth is constrained by a productivity ceiling beyond
which it cannot penetrate. This celling decrees that something like 75% of
the labor force will be in agriculture; that its income above minimum consumption
levels is likely to be dissipated in high living for those vho command land rents-
or otherwise dissipated; that its social values will be geared to relatively
limited fatalistic horizons; and that political power will reside in the regions,
with those who own the land; although there may be fluctuating tension with those
who-along with their soldiers and civil servants--exercise central authority*
Historically, the traditional societies of western Europe were stirred into
what I call the preconditions for take-off by the expansion of trade, from, let
us say, the 16th century forvard. The rise of trade interacted with the develop-
ment of modern science, invention and innovation to produce an interlocking series
of developments in transport, industry and agriculture, as well as a rise in
population. In the 18th century, France, Netherlands and Britain were-like
three race horses--fockeying towards the starting line; but Britain was the
first to move from the preconditions into take-off4
7Once the British take-off--or industrial revolution--was underway from,
say, 1783, it had a profound effect on other societies. It set in motion a
series of what might be called positive and negative demonstration effects,
These demonstration effects are still operating actively in the world--and, in
the end, they will bring industrialization to virtually the whole of the planeta
The last major take-off may well begin before two centuries have passed since
the British showed the wayo
Technically, there are three leading sectors in the preconditions period
whose transformation is a necessary condition for sustained industrial growth0
First, agriculture. A productivity revolution in agriculture is required to
feed the expanding population of the preconditions period and to feed the
cities, likely to be expanding at even higher rates than the average. Seconds,
the export sector: industrialization in its earliest stages is likely to create
an expanded bill for imports, which can only be met by applying quickly modern
techniques to the extraction and higher processing of some natural resource.
Third, social overhead capital 0 The technical transformation of a traditional
society into a position where growth becomes relatively automatic requires large
outlays on transport, education, sources of power, and so on0  Here then-An the
past and at present--are the three key sectors of the transition period, within
which modern manufacturing sectors can begLn to develop and then expand, as
profits are ploughed back into new capacity0
But the development of these sectors is not an antiseptic technical
process: it requires profound social, psychological and political change--
from the attitudes of peasants to those of civil servants and pooliticianso
Much analysis--both Marxist and non-Marxist--has emphasized the role of the
new commercial and industrial middle class in bringing about this transformation0
And the role of the middle class and the profit motive is surely a part of the
8story. But it is only a part of the story, Both in the contemoorary world and
in the more distant past it is perfectly clear that there was another factorO
That cecond factor was the negative demonstration that more advanced societies
could impose their w.ll on the less advanced. This demonstration of the national
and human costs of backwardness has accelerated the preconditions process in
many lands. A reactive nationalism has been a major factor in leading men to t
take the steps necessary to permit growth to become a society's normal condition0
This was so for the transitional periods of Germany, Japan and Russia in the
19th century; and, earlier, it played a crucial role in the formation of the
United States under the Federalists* And it is perfectly evident that in the
contemporary world the most powerful motive for modernization in the under-
developed areas is not the profit motive of the middle class but the widespread
desire to increase human and national dignity0
't is this basis of the preconditions period in a reactive nationalism that
poses one of the key problems of the contemporary world; for nationalism may be
diverted to external goals or ambitions or it may be channeled at home on the
economic and social modernization of the society It is, therefore, one of the
technical preconditions for take-off that governments come to power in the
transitional areas which are prepared to channel a high proportion of their
peoples I energies, talents and resources on to the tasks of economic growth as
opposed to other possible objectives. For the leading sectors of the preconditions-
a productivity revolution in agriculture, the generation of increased foreign
exchange, and the build-up of social overhead capital-all require a significant
degree of governmental leadership and programming: phrases not to be confused
with total government ownership and total planning, which I do not believe to
be necessary conditions for the preconditions period.
9And so, there comes a stage in the life of a society, after the technical,
economic and non-economic processes of preconditioning have moved forward, when
the take-off finally occurs. Some take-offs have been triggered by a political
event-like the Meiji Restoration in Japan or the Chinese and Indian Five Year
Plan of this decade. Some have been triggered by a technical event, like the
coming of the railways to the United States in the 1840's and 1850's and to
Canada and Russia in the 1880's and 1890'so
Since my view of the take-off is available to you in an article in the
Economic Journal of March 1956 I shall not spend much time on it here. In
essence the take-off consists of the achievement of rapid growth in a limited
group of leading sectors: textiles for Great Britain; railroads for the United
States, France, Germany, Canada and Russia; modern timber cutting and railroads
in Sweden. The take-off is distinguished from earlier industrial surges by the
fact that growth becomes self-sustained. Investment rises and remains over
10% net, sufficient to outstrip population growth and to make an increase in
output per capita a regular condition. The momentum in the three key sectors of
the preconditions rust be maintained; that is in agriculture, foreign trade and
social overhead capital. And the economy must demonstrate that it has the
corps of technicians and managers, as well as the institutions of capital
formation to suffer structural shock; to redispose its investment resources;
and to resume growth.
After take-off there follows what I call the drive to maturity. There are
a variety of ways a stage of economic maturity might be defined; for exanple,
in terms of income per head or the structure of the working force. But I have
chosen to define it as the period when a society has effectively applied the
range of (then) modern technology to the bulk of its resources. During the
drive to maturity the industrial process is differentiated, with new leading
sectors gathering momentum to suppiantthe older leading sectors of the take.
off. After the railway take-offs of the 19th century-with coal, iron and
heavy engineering a; the center of the growth process--it is steel, the new
ships, chemicals, electricity and the products of the modern machine tool that
dominate the econouv and sustain the over-all rate of growth* This is also
the case with the Russian drive to maturity in, saythe quarter century after
1929, an historic sequence which bears a family resemblance to the American and
Western 'European drives to maturity of the pre-1914 era, although the Soviet
experience occurred in a somewhat different technological context,
I would offer the following sample as rough symbolic dates for the arrival
of various societies at technological maturity, as I have defined it:
Great Britain 1850
United States 1900
Germany, France 1910
Sweden 1930
Japan 1940
USSR, Canada 1950
Thess dates, for maturity, come more or less sixty years after the dates es-
tablished for the beginning of take-off. There is no body of scientific
argument or evidence I can now offer to make rational such a uniformity, But
it may be that when we explore the implications of some six decades of geometric
progression applied to the capital stoc5 in combination with three generations
of men living under an environment of growth, elements of rationality will emerge,
For the moment, however, I would regard the sixty year interval between take-off
and technological maturity as a rough benchmark at best, pending more serious
study,
As societies move towards technological maturity a number of technical and
non-economic changes occur: the working force not only becomes more urban but
the category of semi-skilled and white collar workers expand; real incomes and
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standards of consumption rise; the professional managers begin to take over
from the original buccaneers who launched the take-off and dominate the early
stages of the drive to maturity. But there is a deeper change as well, reflected
in literature, social and popular thought, and in politicst What is that change?
Men react against the harshness of the drive to maturity; they begin to take
growth and the spread of technology for granted; they cease to regard the further
spread of modern technology as a sufficient human and social objective; and they
ask this question: How shall this mature, industrial machine, with compound
interest built firmly into its structurec;how shal it be used? As I suggested
earlier there are essentially three directions in which the mature nation can
go: -towards social security and leisure; towards the expansion of power on the
world scene; or towards what I call the age of high mass consumption; that is,
the age when economic growth is dominated by the diffusion of the mass automobile,
improved housing, and the electric-powered household gadgetry--from iceboxes to
TV-that an industrial civilization can offer to make life easier, more pleasant,
and more interesting in the home .
I believe a great deal of the history of the 20th century can be told in
terms of the pattern and sequence of choices made by the technologically mature
societies. For example, American history in this century reflects, at different
times, elements of each choice0 There was the brief American flirtation with
world power at the turn of the century. Then there was a phase of social reform
in the progressive era, followed by the plunge in the 1920's into the age of
high mass consumption, with its new leading sectors: automobiles, rubber, oil,
roads, suburban housing, and the familiar gadgetry0 As for the Germans, at
maturity they were terribly tempted and twice succumbed to the temptations of
pressing for world power, and as. Japan came to technological maturity in the
1930's it did the same. I will not go this afternoon in this opening statement
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into an analysis of the inter-war years--but, in general, Western Europe failed
to move at that time fully into the age of high mass consumption. But, in the
past decade Western Europe has made that transition and is now experiencing a
version of the American 1920's. And, in Japan, (at lower levels) something of
the same is harpening. This new phase of growth had given these economies a
momentum not even the greatest optimists predicted just after the Second World
War0
As for the Soviet Union, in the 1920s it reorganized the society which
had experienced a take-off between 1890 and 1914, but had broken down under the
terrible pressures of the First World War. Then, in 1929, the drive to maturity
began, and it was resumed vtth great energy after reconstruction of the damage
of the Second World War. This sequence then, since the 1890's, brings the Soviet
Union to the point where the three-way choice of the technologically mature
society now confronts its political life. That is, in what proportions shall
the resources of the society be used to insure leisure, guarantee human welfare,
to increase consumption; or to seek increased power on the world scene0
What does the contemporary world look like, then, from the perspective
of the stages of economic growth?. In the United States we see a society having
virtually completed the revolutionary- experience of the age of high mass con-
sumption, turning at the margin. to enlarged families and the values of intensified
private life. In Western Europe we see societies at various stages-for
Southern Italy, for example, is only at the end of the preconditions period--
but by and large caught up in the early stages of the age of high mass consumptiono
The Soviet Union, Poland and, perhaps, other parts of Eastern Europe are not far
behind, facing-or almost facing-the r0hoicer' that go with the achievemeut of
technological maturity.
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Meanhile, of course, while the stages of growth have been moving forward
since the end of the Second World War in reasonable order and briskness in the
northwestern part of the world, in China and the southern half of the globe-
from the Celebes to Peru-a great historical drama has been unfolding; these
vast societies, embracing the bulk of the world's population, have been accelera-
ting the preconditions for take-off or actually moving into take-off. And it
is to this second subject--the underdeveloped areas--the problems they confront
and the problems they pose for peaceful co-existence--that I now turn*
The first thing to be said about the underdeveloped areas is that, of
course, they stand at various stages of the growth process, The phrase
"underdeveloped" is inexact. Some of them are actually in the take-off,
Mexico, for example, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and above all China and India,
These societies face many vicissitudes; but I believe the bases have been laid
for sustained growth. The commitment to carry forward goes very deep. In China
and India, for example, I do not believe-looking ahead over the next decade-
that any of us can be confident of the 'olitical form those societies will
assumes but they will, on the average, maintain investment rates that outstrip
,illycurrent rates of population increase.
Elsewhere there are societies in the late stages of the preconditions
period: Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Morocco, for example, and several of the Latin
American states. Indonesia, Pakistan und Burma are only a little behind, if
at allo I do not believe the beginnings of their take-offs are likely to be
delayed more than a decade. But south of the Sahara in Afri ca there are societies
close to the traditional stage which may have to pass through longer preconditioning
processes before sustained growth can be undertaken. The question now arises: is
it scientifically correct to use miy concept of the stages of growth derived
from a generalization of the historical past to analyze the contemporary
problems o f the underdeveloped areas?
In part there is much that is familiar to the historian in the current
scene0 The technical problems of the preconditions still center about the
three leading sectors of that stage: social overhead capital; the generation
of increased exports; and a technological revolution in agriculture. The social
and psychological transformations that must occur are, again, broadly familiar
from the past: the problem of siphoning off of land rents into the modern
sector; the changing of peasant attitudes; the training of a new leadership-
publicp private, or both in various comhinatione-capable of bringing modern
techniques to bear in the various sectors of the econorgy. And, above all, we
can again see, as in the past, that a reactive nationalism, tempted to move in
directions other than economic growth, lies close to the heart of the political
process in many of these regionso
But there is a major technical difference: the pool of technology available
to these underdeveloped nations is greater than ever before. Other late.=
comers have enjoyed this advantage to a degree: Germany, Russia and Japan, for
. example, in the half century before the First World War, coming a bit later
than Britain and the United States, Bat in degr)e we must admit that there is
a substantial difference between the present and the past, etemming from the
size of the pool of unapplied technologyo
This difference, however, cuts both ways: it both complicates the problem
of growth and offers the possibility of accelerating growth. It complicates
growth because the availability of modern techniques of medicine and public
health leads to a radical fall in death rates, which yields much higher rates
of population increase than those in most transitional societies in the pasto
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Excepting the United States and Russia, population increase in the preconditions
and take-off were under 1.5%--generally about 1% And the United States and
Russia had reserves of good land that permitted high rates of population increase
to be sustained-reserves which are not now available to the underdeveloped areas
in most parts of the world. These newer nations are trying to move forward with
population increase rates of 2% and more. This means, in general, that higher
rates of investment must be generated to achieve sustained growth; and, even more
precisely, it means that the revolution in agricultural technique must be pressed
forward with great vigor if the whole development process is not to be throttled
for lack of food.
Now what about peaceful co-existence in the face of this problem. If the
only objective in the morld of the Soviet Union and the United States were to
assist these new nations into sustained growth, technically what the more
advanced countries should do is execute a joint program in three parts0 First,
to offer the underdeveloped areas ample supplies of capital--to ease the general
problem of capital formation under regimes of high rates of population increase0
Second, to offer these nations special assistance-to achieve prompt and radical
increases in agricultural output-including supplies of chemical fertilizers and
aid in building irrigttion facilities0 Third, we should conduct towards them
policies which encourage the local politicians to concentrate their hopes and
energies on the task of economic development.. And we should avoid policics
which divert them from these objectiveso
Thus, if the problem of Soviet-American relations in the underdeveloped
areas were merely technical, I think we could define the changes in policy in
both Washington and Moscow, which would waximize the rate of modernization and
ease the human problems in the underdeveloped areaso
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The United States, for example, would have to do these four specific
things: first, to accept the idea that its major objective in these areas was
to create independent, modern, growing states, whether or not they were prepared
to join in military alliance 1ith the United States.
Second, the United States would have to accept each nation's right to
choose its own balance between private and public enterprise; and so long as
the growth process was seriously pursued, it would have to refrain from imposing
as a condition for loans the acceptance of American patterns of organization
on other societies0
Third, the United States would have to accept the fact that the democratic
process is a matter of degree and direction and not expect these transitional
societies to blossom forth promptly with forms of political organisation
similar to those of the United States and Western Europe.
Fourth, with these objectives and self-denying ordinances, it would have
to offer substantial, long-term loans and technical assistance on which the local
politicians and planners could count over, say, a five-year interval.
These are, as it were, the American conditions for a policy of peaceful
co-existence in the underdeveloped areas. And I would now call your attention
to an important fact.
Looked at closely, these are precisely the directions in which American
policy has been moving in recent years0 It lies behind the creation in 1957
of the D'evelopment Loan Fund and the recent initiatives in the United States
Senate to enlarge that Fund and put it on a long-term basis. It is precisely
this kind of thought which lay behind the President's proposal to the countries
of the Middle East last August before the United Nations0
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Many of us in the United States--including nyself-believe this trend
has not gone far enough; and as citizens we are pressing to see it further
developed; but I believe an objective assessment will support the judgment
that this is the trend in American policy*
Now what about Soviet policy? Leaving China and Eastern Europe apart,
what is required from Moscow is a parallel set of shifts in policy. As you
know, the bulk of Soviet lending outside the Communist Bloc has been localized
in a few areas: Egypt, Syria and Iraq, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and India0  It
is clear that in each of these areas excepting India, the SovietUnion has had
clear, short-run strategic objectives--objectives other than increasing the
rate of growth. In India, from all accounts, the Soviet steel plant and other
technical assistance has been officient end helpful; and it may be that the
case of India will offer to us a chance to experiment more substantially with
peaceful oo-existence.
Overall, however, the Soviet economic assistance program would have to be
substantially modified if it were to offer a basis for a serious collaborative
effort with the United States in the underdeveloped areas* It is now, basically,
a strategic Drogram rather than a program designed to accelerate economic growth
in the underdeveloped areas.
We all know, however, that the problem of co-existence is not merely a
technical matter of collaboration in accelerating the process of economic growth,
"he presently underdeveloped areas are moving through the preconditions or into
take-off- in a world setting of Cold War--of intense ideological and military
competition. If we are serious about the problem of competitive co-existence
in the underdeveloped -areas, the nature of this competition and its consequences
must be candidly faced.
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First let us look at the ideological problem. It in the general theme of
much Communist thought in the underdeveloped areas that only a Communist
dictatorship is capable of overcoming the social and psychological resistances
to moderniation and pressing forward into sustained economic growth. We in the
West believe this is not the case. We believe--as a natter of history and of
faith--that the problems of the preconditions and of the take-off can be over-
come without the surrender of human liberty which the Communist formula requires,
I would not wish to enter into the discussion going forward in Communist
countries as to whether there is one or there are many roads to socialism. But,
as an historian and a social sientist, I would assert categorically that there
are many roads to economic growtho
Whether my view and the western view is correct, this much we can say
objectively about the conditions for peaceful co-existence in the underdeveloped
areas: these nations must be left to decide for themselves. Co-existence demands
that we leave the outcome of the ideologica) debate for the processes of history
within each of these societies; and if we are serious in our concern for their
fate, that they proceed to solve their problems in a setting where capital and
technical assistance is made available to them, without strings concerning thst,
political and military orientation0
You may recall the famous phrase of Mao-Tse-Tung, shortly after the Communist
victory in China in 1949. He announced his intention to pursue a Lean-To-4One-
Side Policy. The condition of competitive co-existence in the underdeveloped
areas is that we both pursue policies--both the United States and the Soviet
Union--which encourage Stand-Up-Straight policies0
Now this is no easy matter, as we all know. We know that very strong
impulses p ess your government and mine to think of the underdeveloped areas
not merely in term of economic growth, not merely in terms of ideological
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orientation, but in terms of military and strategic importanc e. In the case
of the United States, for example, a high proportion of our aid in recent years
has been military aid . This aid has been given not because we enjoy making
military pacts, but because the Korean liar occurred, It is a fact of history
that the truce lines of the Second World War were violated in Korea by org'nized,
armed formations. And it is a fixed basis of American policy--and I am con-
fident that it will remain so-that the United States will take any steps
necessary to protect those truce lines. And it is a hard fact of history that
these truce lines run through various of the underdeveloped regions, giving
them a strategic character and complicating the problem of peaceful ideological
competition as well as the problems of 3conomic growth itself. Thus while we may
be able to move some distance forward toward policies which make life and
progress easier for the peoples in the underdeveloped areas, the greatest thing
the Soviet Union and the United States could do for the areas is to bring the
cold war and the arms race to an end-to make, at last, a serious peace*
I turn now, therefore, to the third of my themes: the relation between the
stages of grorth analysis and the problem of making peace*
What is the situation we confront from which peace must be created?
The Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States now have in their
hands-.and soon France and others will have in their hands-instruments which
grossly surpass in their destructive power anything that has gone before; but
their use presents the risk of triggering circumstances which will destroy the
user and us all. In. a technical sense what has happened is that the proportionality
between industrial potential and usable military force--a proportionality which
existed for about a century and a half--has now been violated. -
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In consequence, the military and foreign policies of the major powers are
being conducted at two distinct and only tenuously related levels: one the level
of mutual deterrence--of mutual frustration with weapons of mass destruction;
the other, the softer level of diplomacy, economic policy, ideological competition,
and conventional weapons of a low order, where the main business of the world
goes on from day to day.
In this softer struggle the major powers operate under great restraint
with respect to powers whose military potential in no way approximates their
own. Setting aside the arms race among the industrial giants-which fills our
minds with images of a bi-polar orld'-the fact is that effective power has been
rapidly diffused since 1945. The paradox of the atomic weapons has permitted
the lesser powers degrees of bargaining freedom they would not have if military
force had not taken so violent and discontinuous a technical leap during the
Second World War and after.
Tito began the exploitation of this paradox, in a sense, with his successful
defiance of Stalin in 1948; but in different ways on different issues Nehru, Nasser,
Ben-Gurion, Adenauer and many others have found ways of exploiting this paradox
within the non-Communist world; and Mao and Gomulka as well as Tito have done
it within the Communist, Bloc. The lesser power cannot always pull it off; as
the young Hungarians in Budapest discovered in 1956; but they were not defeated
with atomic weapons. They were defeated in a police action by old-fashioned
infantry and tanks--a victory for which the Soviet Union has had to pay a high
price in the other area of struggle; that is, the non-military struggle of diplo-
macy and ideology, And the whole of the West-not merely Britain and France-
paid a similar high price for the use of force at Suez, at about the same times
In short, societies still in the preconditions period-like Egypt--or in
the early stages of take-off-like India and China and Yugoslavia-have been able
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to behave in world diplomacy on a significant range of issues--not on all
issues; but over a significant range--as the equivalent of major mature powers;
and this is due to the paradoxical character of the new weapons and the diffusion
of effective power they have brought about.
In the longer run the diffusion of power will acquire a much firmer base
than at presento
Just as the fcrward march of the stages of growth in the latter half of the
19th century shaped the world arena- of the first half of the 20th--bringing
Japan, Russia, Germany, France and the United States into the arena as major
powers-so sequences of change long at work and gathering momentum in the post-
1945 years are determining the somewhat new world arena now coming to life, For
the central fact about the future of world power is the acceleration of the pre-
conditions or the beginnings of take-off in the southern half of the world and
in China. The arena over which the First and Second World Wars was fought-and
-the first phase of the cold war--ending with the Korean truce-no longer exists0
To make this idea still more concrete, accept fcr a moment =I notion of a
sixty year interval between take-off and technological maturity We then can
say that by 2000 or 2010-which is not very far away -- India and China, with at
least 2 billion souls between them, will be, in my sense, mature powers. They
may not yet be rich They may not be ready for the age -of high mass consumption,
although even this is not ruled out* But they will have the capacity to apply
to their resources the full capabilities of (then) modern science and technology,
The central fact to which all nations must foreseeably accommodate their
policies then, is the likelihood that the arena of power will enlarge to become
for the first time in history truly global; and that the centers of effective
power within it will increase6
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This is the setting in which your country and mine confront the problem
of peace.
Technically the central problem of peace consists in the installation of a
system of arms control and inspection within.a level of armaments agreement which
would offer all powers greater security than that now afforded by an arms race of
mutual deterrence, with an increasing number of atomic powers in the game. Given
the nature of modern weapons and the opportunities for their concealment, this
in turn requires that all societies be opened up to inspectors who could, in
effect, gp anywhere, at any time, without notice0
An American newspaper I bought in Venice a few weeks ago reproduced a
Soviet cartoon of the American concept of inspection: it showed quite recognisable
American types, equipped wLth horn-rimmed spectacles and cameras climbing all
over Soviet factories with great vigor--a kind of Intourist group running wild.
And Mr. Khrushchev has several times referred to the A.merican concept of in-
spection as espionage. Although I think inspection could be made more orderly
than the cartoon suggested, essentially Mr. Krhushchev is correct. The alternative
to the arms race is that all peoples come to live with inspectors from other
nations wandering about our societies in quite a free way, with, perhaps, some
United Nations photographic planes going overhead from time to timeo
This is a quite revolutionary notion; and it is by no means an easy notion
for our peoples or governments to accept. But it is the only response that will
permit us to deal successfully with the threat which lies in the new weapons and
in their gradual diffusion about the world. And I am convinced that, despite
honest and well-founded doubts and worries the government of the United States
would accept such a drastic alteration in national sovereignty if it were con-
vined that the inspection privileges within the Communist bloc were bona fideo
And I am convincede-although this only you can decide-that it is the interest
of the Soviet Union to accept such a policyo
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Why should the Soviet Union now join in an effective system of arm control,
based on relatively free inspection?
The prospect for the Soviet Union, as for the United States, is to see many
new nations come into the world arena which neither the Soviet Union nor the
United States can effectively control. As atomic weapon capabilities spread,
these new nations will be in a position to take actions which might precipitate
a war equally disastrous to Russian and to American interests0
As we look out on the world-with vast areas moving into the preconditions
and the take-off tit is clear that history is creating a world of a good many
middling powers. The Soviet Union and the United States stand at an interval
of relative primacy; but that primacy is transient We can use that interval
to contest with one another; we can dissipate this interval in a cold war for
which history will offer us little respect and little thanks; we can, clearly,
destroy each other and most of the planet in a hot war, if we fail to maintain
our poise and good sense. But there is also a great construction option open
to us both. We can use this interval to create an effective system of arms
control; and to concentrate our efforts, along with those of others, on making
that system uork. Tho common objective ehould be to make the system of arms
control so solid and secure over the coming decades that as the new nations move
to technological maturity, thq eater a world of orderly politics rather than
one where the power struggle persists with weapons of mass destruction still
one of the pawns.
I am sure, from recent Soviet initiatives, that some perception of this
problem already exists in your country. It certainly lies to some degree behind
the emphasis on the w gency of ending H-bomb tests. This act would, in effect,
freeze atomic weapons capabilities more or less where they are. But this approach
cannot hold up, unless it is soon 'followed by the real thing; that is, an effective
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international system of arm control. Put another way, the newer powers (China
and India, for example), and some of the older powers (Germany and Japan, for
example) are unlikely to permit atomic weapons capabilities to be limited to
the Big Three or Four, while the cold war goes on in its old terms--merely
without H-bomb tests,
In short, it is not a realistic option to conceive of a continued bilateral
or trilateral morld of atomic powers blocking the others out, but continuing
the competitive game of cold war; nor is it a realistic option to conceive of a
world controlled by Washington, by MosCow or by us bothe We do have in our
grasp one realistic option: it does lie within our grasp to make the terms and
the setting within which power will be diffused, as new nations take off and
march to maturity; but that is the historical limit of our powers. The diffusion
of power can be rendered relatively safe or very dangerous; but it cannot be
prevented. The process of growth and the stages at which various nations now
stand rule out equally the notion of an American century, a Chinese century, a
German century, a Japanese century or a Russian century0
I profoundly believe, therefore, that it is the interest of the Soviet
Union to exercise this historic interval of option to join the United States in
mposing mutually on one another the one thing the world would accept from the
two great powers; that is, an effective system of arms control0
.I know the problems in the United States that would make this policy
difficult to bring to life; but, as I said earlier, I am convinced the United
States is prepared to go forward. I think I understand some of the difficulties
that this policy poses. for the Soviet Union, and I have ctated elsewihore ry view
of those Soviet dif ficulties0  But you know Soviet problems better than I; and it
is not for me to instruct you in this matter 0
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I would only say this much. When we' think of alleviating the cold war,
or finding the terms for peaceful co-existence-the first instinct of politicians-
and of scholars who know something of the complexity of the world is to think of
gradual solutions by small steps. And I am quite clear that the resolution I
propose to you this afternoon will take time to clarify; time to think over and
debate among ourselves; time to implement by negotiation. But of one thing I
am convinced: we must think in terms of a radical solution to our common dangers.
If we keep our heads and our sense of humor we have some time in hand; but not
much. The passage of too much time and the march of the stages of growth may
let this interval-when Russians and Americans still have the power of decision
in their hands-pass beyond us.
My thesis about peaceful co-existence comes then to this, If the Soviet
Union and the United States are to live in peaceful co-existence certain facts
must be faced-facts which are, I believe, illuminated by our concept of the
stages of growth. One fact is that, if we are to have peaceful co-existence in
the underdeveloped areas, changes in both American and Soviet policy are neceesary,
I see signs of change in American policy; and I would be intcrested to know if you
detect parallel changes in Soviet policy.
But the greatest contribution we both could make to the development of the
underdeveloped areas would be to make a serious peace, ending the arms race,
This would not merely free vast resources for peaceful purposes, including aid,
for almost 2C% of Soviet S national product and 10% of the American gross
national product are tied up in military outlays-but peace would lift from
the underdeveloped arene the burden of being located at points of strategic
competition. In such a setting, I believe we would find it quite possible for
ideological competition to go on without grave dangera
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Finally I have argued that the sequence of stages of growth gives to the
Soviet Union and the United States a comon interest and a common responsibility
to end the arms race soon, by imposing on each other and simultaneously on others,
through international negotiation, a system of arms control based on effective
international inspection
Now, if I may, a final word, as a fellow economist and social scientist
As you have gathered, I am not a Marxist. But on one point Marx was right
and I share his view. The end of all this--the meaning of Marx historical
sequence and the stages of growth--s not geometric progression forever It is
not an interminable race in index numbers of industrial production. The end of
all this is the adventure of seeing what man can and will do when the pressure
of scarcity is substantially lifted from him; when, in Marx's good phrase: "Labor
itsolf is a prime necessity of life." We economists ebuld take economics
seriously--but not too seriously, recalling always Keynes' toast before the
Royal Economic Society in 1945. "I give you," he said, "the toast of the Royal
Economic Society, of economics and economists, who are the trusteen not of
civilization, but of the possibility of civilizationot" And we should bear
this admonition in' mind not only as an injunction to hasten the day when all
can share the choices open in the stage of high mass consumption and beyond;
but we should bear this injunction in mind in the process of moving to that
stage,
Hundreds of millions of human beings must live in the world over the century
or so until the age of high mass consumption becomes universal. They have the
right to live their time in civilized settings, marked by a degree of respect
for their uniqueness and for their dignity, marked by policies of balance in
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their societies-rnot merely an obsession with statistics of production whose
technical and philosophic ambiguities you understand quite as well as I do8
Man is a complex being, as the great artists and writers and thinkers of
all countries have long since made clear. And human life is not a numbers
racket0
Moreover, as an hypothesis of social science and a statement of faith: the
goals we achieve in history cannot be separated from the means we use to achieve
them, There may not be much civilisation left to save unless we-all of us-
you in a society having largely completed the drive to technological maturity,
and rapidly moving beyond-I from a society only a bit further down the road-
unless all of us deal with the challenge implicit in the stages of growth as
they now stand in the world, at the full stretch of our idealism, as well as our
energy and our technical talentzo
I thank you with utmost sincerity for 4iving me this opportunity tc talk to
you; and I greatly look forward to the discussion.
W.W. Rostow
Moscow, May 25, 1959
